A new federal report reveals that multiple layers of safety failed in the seconds before a deadly runway collision last month at New York’s LaGuardia Airport, including air traffic control decisions, communication breakdowns and technology limitations.
On March 22, at about 11:37 p.m., Jazz Aviation Flight 646, operating as Air Canada Flight 8646, collided with an airport rescue vehicle while landing at LaGuardia Airport in New York City, killing both pilots and injuring dozens of others, according to the report.
The National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) preliminary report released Thursday found that an air traffic control tower’s local controller, referred to in the report as the "LC," cleared an airport rescue vehicle to cross an active runway even as a regional jet was on a short final approach.
At the time, the plane was about a quarter-mile from the runway and roughly 130 feet above the ground as it descended toward landing.
Seconds later, the controller instructed the vehicle to stop, but the warning came too late as the aircraft touched down and continued down the runway.
Investigators pointed to confusion over radio communications that may have delayed the truck crew’s response.
"The turret operator in Truck 1 recalled hearing the words ‘stop stop stop’ (on the tower frequency) radio, but he did not know who that transmission was intended for," the report states. "He subsequently heard ‘Truck 1 stop stop stop’ and realized it was for them and subsequently noticed that they had entered the runway.
"He further recalled that as they turned left, he saw the airplane’s lights on the runway," the report added.
There were two controllers on duty at the time of the crash, consistent with normal staffing levels, and both were experienced and qualified for their positions.
But the tower was handling multiple issues simultaneously, including an aircraft that had performed two rejected takeoffs and a separate ground emergency near a terminal.
As the situation unfolded, the "LC" took over transmitting instructions on both ground and tower frequencies.
The report also highlights significant limitations in the airport’s safety systems.
The airport’s surface detection system, known as ASDE-X, is designed to track aircraft and ground vehicles and alert controllers to potential runway conflicts.
"Multiple ground vehicles, none of which were equipped with transponders, were intermittently detected as radar targets," the report read. "At the time of the accident, ASDE-X displayed only two radar targets on taxiway D (near taxiway BB), rather than all seven of the response vehicles as distinct targets at their respective locations.
"A review of the ASDE-X system data by the FAA determined that the system did not generate an aural or visual alert on the ASDE-X displays in the LGA ATC tower to warn controllers of the potential runway conflict."
The NTSB also found that another layer of protection failed to prevent the crash.
Runway entrance lights, known as RELs, are designed to warn vehicles not to cross when an aircraft is approaching.
"A review of airport surveillance video recordings revealed that the RELs illuminated for the arrival of the accident airplane, as Truck 1 and company were stationary in the vicinity of the taxiway AA and taxiway D intersection," the report said, noting the trucks were located about 300 feet away from runway 4.
"The RELs on taxiway D remained illuminated until about the time Truck 1 reached the (near) edge of runway, when they extinguished, about 3 seconds prior to the collision."
The report does not indicate whether the truck crew saw or reacted to the warning lights.
Taken together, investigators suggest the crash was not caused by a single error, but by a breakdown across multiple safeguards — including human decision-making, communication clarity and technological support systems.
The collision killed both pilots aboard the aircraft and injured dozens of passengers and emergency responders.
The report describes a chaotic but ultimately orderly evacuation after the crash.
"The aft flight attendant reported getting in the aft jump seat for landing and described the flight as normal until he felt an impact and jar," the report read. "He did not know what had happened and attempted to call the pilots and received no response. He reported the conditions were dark, but passengers deplaned orderly through all exits."
Investigators said the debris field was roughly 300 feet long and 150 feet wide and was documented using drone imaging, GPS mapping and laser scanning technology.
The preliminary investigation also found that the most severe damage was concentrated at the front of the aircraft, with the cockpit and forward cabin sustaining significant structural destruction.
The report found that while the forward section was heavily crushed, the passenger cabin remained largely intact, with most seats still secured and only minor damage reported throughout much of the aircraft.
The NTSB said the information in the report is preliminary and subject to change.